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1. Background 
 
1. The Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) started in 2017 to work on the draft-
ing of a second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, in view of rendering 
traditional mutual assistance (MLA) under the Convention more effective (including 
through the provision of video conference hearing and emergency MLA procedures) and 
introducing the possibility of direct disclosure from service providers in other jurisdictions. 
Such direct disclosure poses new challenges, implying that data protection safeguards 
inserted in the Protocol must also adequately cover the scenario of direct cooperation, in 
addition to traditional MLA scenarios to obtain data from service providers.  
 
2. It bears relevance to recall that, leading up to the 2018 Octopus Conference, the 36th 
Plenary of Convention 108 (19-21 June 2018) adopted Provisional Answers to the Dis-
cussion paper for the 2018 Octopus Conference. In addition, the available preparatory 
documents for the 38th Plenary of Convention 108 (13-14 June 2019),  were a T-CY dis-
cussion paper on conditions for obtaining subscriber information in relation to dynamic 
versus static IP addresses, a T-CY discussion note for the consultation with data protec-
tion experts (consultation which was held in Strasbourg on 26 November 2018, in which 
both the Secretariat of the Committee of Convention 108 and the expert participated), 
and an expert note on the inclusion of data protection safeguards relating to law en-
forcement trans-border access to data in the second Additional Protocol (document T-
PD(2019)3). The Committee of Convention 108 recalls that the Second additional Proto-
col should adequately reflect the Council of Europe acquis on fundamental rights and 
freedoms, in particular on the protection of personal data. It is therefore essential to en-
sure consistency of the Second additional Protocol with Convention 108+ (Convention 
108 as amended by Protocol CETS 223) which applies to all data processing carried out 
in the public and private sectors. The current opinion draws and expands on a number of 
elements, listed hereafter, which were already raised in the Committee of Convention 
108 provisional answers to the above mentioned discussion paper for the 2018 Octopus 
conference and/or in the recent expert note: 
 
a. priority must be given to improving traditional MLA procedures, whereas direct coop-
eration should be kept for specific cases as an expedited procedure; 
b. envisaged direct cooperation or expedited MLA procedures should ideally be limited 
to subscriber information only; 
c. when pertaining to subscriber information, the data protection, procedural and rule of 
law safeguards of at least both the requesting and the requested Parties should be 
taken into account; 
d. if pertaining to traffic information after all, the data protection, procedural and rule of 
law safeguards of at least both the requesting Party and the Party where the data 
subject has used the service(s) should be taken into account; 
e. envisaged direct disclosure or expedited MLA procedures must be established on a 
proper legal basis, and be in conformity, as far as transfer of personal data is con-
cerned, with Article 14 of Convention 108+, avoiding systematic reliance on deroga-
tions at all price; 
f. any newly established cooperation regime must comply with other relevant data pro-
tection requirements, such as with regard to the limited storage of data, subsequent 
use of data, processing of sensitive data, data breach notification, transparency, ac-
countability, and effective independent oversight; 
g. any newly established disclosure regime must either be framed in a unified data pro-
tection regime, based on Convention 108+, ideally by inviting Parties to join the lat-
ter, or in an optional data protection regime, comparable with that of Article 26.3, 
2nd indent of ETS 182, allowing for the combined application of the data protection 
regimes of the relevant Parties, in line with their national and international data pro-
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tection commitments, and reflecting compliance with a range of jointly established 
substantive data protection principles, in line with  Convention 108+.   
 
3. In light of the upcoming Octopus Conference of 20-22 November 2019 and related 
consultation, the T-CY has now released new provisional text of provisions of the draft 
Second Additional Protocol, as well as a discussion guide for consultations, thereby 
seeking written comments from stakeholders, including data protection authorities, and 
the Committee of Convention 108. 
 
4. The present document provides the provisional position of the Committee of Conven-
tion 108 on the newly released provisional text and explanatory report of the draft second 
Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (ETS 185) regarding 
specifically the provisions on direct disclosure of subscriber information and giving effect 
to orders from another Party for expedited production of data (other provisional texts of 
provisions submitted to consultation fall out of the Committee’s field of expertise). 
 
5. In a note preceding the draft text and explanatory report of the articles concerned, 
the T-CY has set out that these “may change as the negotiations develop, depending on 
the outcome of other provisions that have not yet been prepared and/or other comments 
received” and that they “should be considered by the [T-CY Protocol Drafting Group and 
Protocol Drafting Plenary] in order to determine whether further changes are required 
[…] (in view of the unique circumstances of direct cooperation between authorities and 
providers) once the ongoing work on conditions and safeguards, including with regard to 
data protection and privacy, has resulted in a text and explanatory report” [emphasis 
added]. 
 
6. Consequently, the present opinion does not only pertain to the provisional text and 
explanatory report of both articles concerned, but also provides provisional input of the 
Committee of Convention 108 for the T-CY’s on-going work on conditions and safe-
guards with regard to data protection. Reference is made here to page 18, point 4.2, pa-
ra 11, in fine, respectively page 29, point 5.2, para 19-20 of the draft explanatory report 
(to paragraph 2 of the draft article on direct disclosure of subscriber information respec-
tively paragraph 8 of the draft article on expedited production of data between traditional 
authorities). In these instances, the T-CY explicitly envisages to include an article in the 
Second Additional Protocol to conditions and safeguards with regard to data protection. 
The Committee of Convention 108 looks forward to the provisional text of this crucial part 
of the second Additional Protocol, and highlights that the present opinion is intrinsically 
dependent on the content of that important part, on which it stresses it wishes to be con-
sulted in as early a stage possible and for which the Committee stands ready to provide 
its expertise (including on the interpretation of the data protection principles included un-
der 7). 
 
2. Direct disclosure of subscriber information 
 
7. In line with the proposed scoping in the explanatory report (on pages 16-17, in point 
4.2, para 4) of subscriber data as potentially inclusive of both static and dynamic IP ad-
dresses: 
 
“Information needed [in specific cases] for the purpose of identifying a subscriber of 
a service may include certain Internet Protocol (IP) address information – for exam-
ple, the IP address used at the time when an account was created, the most recent 
log-on IP address or the log-on IP addresses used at a specific time”, 
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The Committee of Convention 108 recognises that access to both static or dynamic IP 
addresses may be required in specific cases for the sole purpose of establishing the in-
formation as meant in Article 18.3 of the Budapest Convention. It stresses, however, that 
subscriber data should never be inclusive of any (other) traffic data or content data. The 
Committee therefore recommends to specify under which circumstances IP addresses 
could be considered as subscriber information, as meant in Article 18.3 of the Budapest 
Convention, especially paying due attention to the fact that, depending on the circum-
stances, an IP address may be evidence of who owns a subscriber account, but does not 
necessarily identify the individual user at any given time. Moreover, The Committee can 
only support the potential inclusion of IP addresses under subscriber information if it is 
specified in the actual Protocol text (both in the articles on direct disclosure and tradition-
al orders for expedited disclosure) and it the corresponding parts of the explanatory re-
port that IP addresses are to be used solely for identification purposes and in specific 
cases only. 
 
8. The Committee of Convention 108 equally recognises that some Parties currently 
treat dynamic IP address information as traffic data (for constitutional or other principled 
reasons, as documented in the T-CY discussion paper on conditions for obtaining sub-
scriber information in relation to dynamic versus static IP addresses). Based thereon, the 
T-CY has suggested, through the insertion of para 9.b of the draft text, to allow such Par-
ties to reserve the right not to apply the provision on disclosure of subscriber information 
to “certain types of access numbers” (also reflected in the proposed explanatory report 
on page 17, in point 4.2, para 4: “Accordingly, paragraph 9.b provides a reservation for 
some Parties”). The Committee of Convention 108 regrets that the proposed solution 
might lead to a fragmented regime for criminal cooperation and the protection of personal 
data, thus impacting the effectiveness of the Protocol. 
 
9. Along the same lines, the Committee of Convention 108 notes the full opt-out possi-
bility (in point 9.a of the draft text) for Parties not to apply the direct disclosure regime. 
Due to the fragmentation that is likely to arise from the variability of regimes, the “[high] 
expectations set for the new Protocol”, in that it “will need to stand the test of time in or-
der to make a difference in terms of an effective criminal justice response with human 
rights and rule of law safeguards” (T-CY discussion guide for the upcoming 2019 Octo-
pus Conference, in fine), may not be met. If introduced at all, any new direct disclosure 
regime should be sufficiently straightforward and binding for all ratifying Parties, sustain-
ably building on a common commitment to shared data protection conditions, safeguards 
or principles (infra, under points 6 and 7).  
 
10. The Committee of Convention 108 favours a mandatory notification regime instead 
of the optional notification possibility foreseen under point 5. 
 
3. Giving effect to orders from another Party for expedited production of data 
 
11. Whilst the explanatory report to paragraph 4 of the proposed text on traditional orders 
for expedited production of data (page 28, point 5.2, para 14) rightly points out that “under 
some Parties’ domestic laws, the production of traffic data may require further information 
because there are additional requirements in their laws for obtaining such data”, the Commit-
tee of Convention 108 questions the position that the only consequence thereof is that “addi-
tional information may need to be provided to the requested Party in order for it to give effect 
to the order”. The possibility of an opt-out from the regime as far as traffic data is concerned, 
as foreseen in paragraph 12 of the proposed text, is equally insufficient. 
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12. The Committee of Convention 108 believes that the mere reference to potentially higher 
domestic standards or the opt-out possibility for Parties in relation to obtaining traffic data 
does not adequately capture the principled and historical distinction the Budapest Conven-
tion has made between measures relating to subscriber data vs. measures relating to traffic 
data. The Committee of Convention 108 believes that such principled distinction should not 
be sacrificed for alleged reasons of efficiency.  
 
13. Even more fundamentally, and in line with its provisional answers to the discussion 
paper for the 2018 Octopus Conference, the Committee of Convention 108 takes the posi-
tion that, as a minimum requirement, a Protocol regime for disclosure of traffic data should 
allow for the combined data protection, procedural and rule of law safeguards of at least the 
Party of the requesting competent authority and the Party where the data subject was pre-
sent whilst using the targeted service(s), if different from the requesting Party or the Party 
where the service provider is present. A person who is communicating or using services in a 
Party’s territory has a legitimate expectation of privacy under primarily the laws of that Party. 
As soon as it is possible to establish, based on the prior obtaining of subscriber data, where 
a person was while using any targeted service(s), it is key for the Protocol to make sure that 
the data protection, procedural and rule of law safeguards of the latter Party may be applied 
and complied with. If that Party is the Party where the order originates from, such assurance 
is implied already. Only in such case, the Protocol may suffice allowing for the combined 
data protection, procedural and rule of law safeguards of at least the Party of the re-
questing competent authority and the Party where the service provider [or executing 
competent authority] is located (as in para 27, infra). The Protocol should moreover con-
tain specific provisions which would guide Parties in case of conflict of laws, in that the laws 
offering the widest protection to the data subject will apply. 
 
4. Insufficient criteria for determining territorial ‘presence’ of a service provider 
 
14. Both the suggested direct disclosure and traditional cooperation mechanism pertain 
to the obtaining of data from service providers in another Party’s territory. The related 
draft explanatory report to both mechanisms (respectively in paragraph 10 page 18 and 
paragraph 5 page 26) reads as follows:  
 
“[T]he term ‘a service provider in the territory of another Party’ requires that the ser-
vice provider be physically present in the other Party. Under this Article, the mere 
fact that, for example, a service provider has established a contractual relationship 
with a company in a Party, but the service provider itself is not physically present in 
that Party, would not constitute the service provider being ‘in the territory’ of that Par-
ty. Paragraph 1 requires, in addition, that the data be in the service provider’s pos-
session or control.” 
 
15. The Committee of Convention 108 insists that further clarification be added, ideally in 
the text of the draft articles themselves, if not at least in the corresponding parts of the 
explanatory report, on when a service provider will be considered ‘physically present’ in a 
Party’s territory. Against the back-drop of the significant jurisprudential contention in the 
past decade around jurisdiction over service providers abroad, in which a multitude of 
criteria (a range of ‘establishment’ criteria, ‘offering’ criteria etc.) has passed in review, 
the above two criteria (negatively: that a contractual relationship does not suffice; posi-
tively: that data must be in the service provider’s possession or control) seem insufficient 
to bring optimal clarity. The Committee of Convention 108 finds such clarity crucial in 
order for any future mechanism not to be undermined as well as to avoid forum shopping 
by authorities/Parties (which would be avoided if mandatory common safeguards were to 
be incorporated in the Protocol). Not only may the latter confront multinational service 
providers with parallel orders issued to its establishments or branches in several jurisdic-
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tions, it may also encourage authorities/Parties to opt for sending orders to the jurisdic-
tion of presence of the service provider where the lowest data protection standards ap-
ply. The Committee of Convention 108 sees relevance in adding more clarity, e.g. by stipu-
lating in the Protocol or in the explanatory report that a service provider will be considered 
‘physically present’ in a Party’s territory when it has a stable infrastructure through which 
it actually pursues an economic activity for an indefinite period and from where the busi-
ness of providing services is carried out or managed.  
 
5. Confidentiality 
 
16. The explanatory report to paragraph 4.f of the envisaged article on disclosure of sub-
scriber information (page 19, point 4.2, para 17) clarifies that the “special procedural instruc-
tions” that need to accompany a disclosure order submitted to service providers are meant 
to “cover, in particular, any request for confidentiality, including a request for non-disclosure 
of the order to the subscriber or other third parties”. Even if the Committee of Conven-
tion 108 sees no difficulty with this, it does however request reconsideration of the opening 
left in the further explanation given for domestic laws or discretionary policies of service pro-
viders that would not guarantee the confidentiality sought (“Therefore, in order to avoid the 
risk of premature disclosure of the investigation, Parties are encouraged to be aware of ap-
plicable law and a service provider’s policies concerning subscriber notification, prior to 
submitting the order under paragraph 1 to the service provider”). Whilst confidentiality may 
be important to maintain efficiency in criminal investigations, it may equally be vital in safe-
guarding data protection. The Committee of Convention 108 therefore favours the inclusion 
of a self-standing provision on confidentiality in the Protocol, for which it suggests inspiration 
is drawn from: 
 
Article 26.2 of the Budapest Convention (ETS 185): “Prior to providing such information, 
the providing Party may request that it be kept confidential or only used subject to condi-
tions. If the receiving Party cannot comply with such request, it shall notify the providing 
Party, which shall then determine whether the information should nevertheless be pro-
vided. If the receiving Party accepts the information subject to the conditions, it shall be 
bound by them”; 
 
Article 27.8 of the Budapest Convention (ETS 185): “The requesting Party may request 
that the requested Party keep confidential the fact of any request made under this chap-
ter as well as its subject, except to the extent necessary for its execution. If the request-
ed Party cannot comply with the request for confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the 
requesting Party, which shall then determine whether the request should nevertheless 
be executed”; 
 
Article 25 of the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on MLA in criminal mat-
ters (ETS 182): “The requesting Party may require that the requested Party keep confi-
dential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute 
the request. If the requested Party cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, 
it shall promptly inform the requesting Party”. 
 
17. The explanatory report to the envisaged article on traditional orders for the expedited 
production of data (page 26, point 5.2, para 8) clarifies that “[u]nder paragraph 3.c, the re-
quest should also include all special instructions, including for example requests for certifica-
tion or confidentiality under Article 27.8 of the Convention, at the time of transmission to en-
sure the proper processing of the request”. Whilst the Committee of Convention 108 sup-
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ports the reference to confidentiality and to Article 27.8 of the Budapest Convention, it 
stresses that, from the draft T-CY text as it stands, it cannot be derived that Article 27.8 of 
the Budapest Convention applies in a Protocol context. The reference, however, underlines 
the importance, stressed above by Committee of Convention 108, that a self-standing provi-
sion on confidentiality be included in the Protocol itself, for both the direct and the traditional 
mechanism for obtaining information from service providers. 
 
6. Data protection conditions and safeguards 
 
18. In the absence of a draft text for the envisaged article on data protection (supra, un-
der para 6), the Committee of Convention 108 raises particular concern regarding the 
non-insertion in the draft text and explanatory report as they stand of two-directional data 
protection conditions, including for asymmetrical transfers under the direct disclosure of sub-
scriber information regime (point 4 of the T-CY draft), but equally for traditional MLA to giving 
effect to orders for expedited production of data (point 5 of the T-CY draft). 
 
19. The Committee of Convention 108 stresses the importance of making sure, at least, 
that data protection conditions and safeguards be inserted in the Protocol, applicable in 
two directions, since the receiving entity may be: 
 
- either a competent authority: 
 
- in the case of traditional MLA: both the requesting and requested authority being 
the recipient of personal data, i.e. of the personal data provided in the request or 
of the personal data transferred as a result of the execution of a request; 
- in the case of direct, asymmetrical transfers: the requesting authority being the re-
cipient of personal data transferred by a private data controller (service provider); 
 
- or a private data controller (service provider), which, in the case of direct, asymmet-
rical transfers is the recipient of personal data provided in the request. 
 
20. The draft text and explanatory report as they stand, remain silent on the matter, save 
for a double reference in the explanatory report to paragraph 2 of the proposed draft text 
on direct, asymmetrical disclose of subscriber information (page 18, point 4.2, para 11), 
and a single reference in the explanatory report to paragraph 8 of the draft article on ex-
pedited production of data between traditional authorities (page 29, point 5.2, para 19 
and 20). The three references are exclusively targeted at “parties that have data protec-
tion requirements” (first two) or would wish to limit or refuse cooperation based on “condi-
tions and safeguards (including with regard to data protection)” (third). The first reference 
is only a reminder to parties having data protection requirements of their obligation under 
domestic laws to provide “a clear basis for the processing of personal data” by service 
providers in response to an order which they directly received. The second reference 
relates to international data transfers, without, however, stipulating the actual safeguards 
that a service provider may require (from the recipient Party or authority) to be able to 
transfer “responsive subscriber information”. In contrast, the explanatory text only fea-
tures a blank cross-reference to a future article on data protection, whilst axiomatically 
stating that (a Party’s implementation law for) the Protocol reflects the “important public 
interest” of the direct cooperation regime (discussion continued infra, under para 20). The 
framing of the third reference is of concern: the explanatory report (page 29, point 5.2, 
para 20) warns that “mutual assistance is in principle to be extensive, and impediments 
thereto strictly limited”, so that “accordingly, conditions and refusals should also be lim-
ited in line with the objectives of this Article to eliminate barriers to transborder sharing of 
subscriber information and traffic data and to provide more efficient and expedited pro-
cedures than traditional mutual assistance”. The Committee of Convention 108 considers 
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that labelling data protection conditions and safeguards as potential ‘impediments’ and 
‘barriers’ is inappropriate and does not reflect the balanced functioning of democracies 
safeguarding human rights and the rule of law. It is furthermore not in line with the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights. It believes – based on tangible experiences 
– that the efficiency of cooperation would be genuinely enhanced when embedded in a 
shared commitment to respect common data protection principles.  
 
21. In claiming that the envisaged direct disclosure regime in the Protocol reflects an 
“important public interest” (supra, under 19), the T-CY proposal seeks to base the entire 
direct disclosure concept exclusively on the derogations provided in Article 14.4.c of 
Convention 108+ and, as far as EU Member States are concerned, in Articles 49.1(d) 
juncto 49.4 GDPR [emphasis below added] 
 
Article 14.4 Convention 108+ – Transborder flows of information 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the previous paragraphs, each Party may provide that 
the transfer of personal data may take place if: […] c. prevailing legitimate interests, in 
particular important public interests, are provided for by law and such transfer consti-
tutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society; […]. 
 
Article 49 GDPR – Derogations for specific situations 
 
1. In the absence of an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45(3), or of appropriate 
safeguards pursuant to Article 46, including binding corporate rules, a transfer or a set 
of transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organisation shall take 
place only on one of the following conditions: […] (d) the transfer is necessary for im-
portant reasons of public interest; […]. 
 
4. The public interest referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 
shall be recognised in Union law or in the law of the Member State to which the control-
ler is subject. 
 
22. In line with its provisional answers to the discussion paper for the 2018 Octopus 
Conference and the recent expert note (document T-PD(2019)3), the Committee of Con-
vention 108 disagrees firmly with the above approach, and opposes the envisaged struc-
tural and systemic reliance on derogations as a standardised means to allow for direct, 
asymmetrical transfers.  
 
23. The Committee of Convention 108, in contrast, reiterates its position that the most 
straightforward, sustainable and widely acceptable way to guarantee an appropriate 
level of data protection under the Protocol would be the accession by the Protocol Par-
ties to Convention 108+. As a result, an appropriate level of data protection would be 
generically guaranteed by all Parties to the Protocol and indirectly become a default 
standard also for the application amongst them of the Budapest Convention itself.  
 
24. In a subsidiary manner, i.e. where the option of accession by the Protocol Parties to 
Convention 108+ (supra) does not prove feasible, the Committee of Convention 108 fa-
vours the incorporation in the Protocol (as a legally binding instrument between the Par-
ties) of common mandatory data protection safeguards [list as included infra, under point 
7], grounded in, closely aligned with and consistently interpreted in line with Convention 
108+. 
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25. In an even more subsidiary manner and as an absolute minimum, the Committee of 
Convention 108, in line with the recent expert note (document T-PD(2019)3), urges the T-
CY to take Article 26 (pertaining to “Data protection”) of the Second Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on MLA in criminal matters (ETS 182) as a point of departure, thus en-
suring consistency with at least the Council of Europe’s data protection acquis in the con-
text of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This would imply insertion in the Protocol 
(as a legally binding instrument between the Parties) of an optional regime, comparable 
with that of Article 26.3, 2nd indent of ETS 182: 
 
“Any Party may refuse to transfer personal data obtained as a result of the execution 
of a request made under the Convention or any of its Protocols where […] the Party 
to which the data should be transferred is not bound by [Convention 108+], unless 
the latter Party undertakes to afford such protection to the data as is required by the 
former Party”,  
 
which would need to be rephrased so as to enable two-directional applicability, both in 
the context of direct transfers and transfers between traditional competent authorities. 
 
26. Further, in case the Protocol Parties were not all to accede to Convention 108+ or no 
new, mandatory data protection conditions and safeguards were to be inserted in the 
Protocol, the Committee of Convention 108 suggests, in order to enable and ensure (and 
if necessary: enforce) compliance by private data controllers (service providers) with the 
data protection conditions and safeguards in the Protocol (i.e. a public international law 
instrument, incapable of directly binding private parties), to stipulate in the latter that if a 
data controller or competent authority of a Party requires an appropriate level of data 
protection in the receiving Party, such condition shall be considered to be met if: 
 
“the receiving competent authority or data controller of the latter Party undertakes to 
process the personal data transferred subject to the conditions and safeguards un-
der the domestic law of the former Party [i.e. the Party from where personal data 
would be transferred], including obligations upon the latter under Convention 108 
and its Protocol and/or other applicable bilateral, regional or international data pro-
tection agreements or instruments guaranteeing the protection of individuals by the 
implementation of at least the following safeguards, grounded in, closely aligned with 
and consistently interpreted in line with Convention 108+ [list as included infra, under 
point 7]”. 
 
27. In doing so, as a minimum requirement, as posited also in the provisional answers to 
the discussion paper for the 2018 Octopus Conference and the recent expert note (docu-
ment T-PD(2019)3), a Protocol regime for disclosure of subscriber data should allow for 
the combined data protection obligations of at least the Party of the requesting compe-
tent authority and the Party where the service provider or executing competent authority 
is located. This would also be seen as a step forward into international harmonisation of 
data protection requirements in the field of criminal justice cooperation.   
 
28. Since an undertaking as above lacks the “legally-binding and enforceable” character 
of safeguards as required under Article 14.3.b of Convention 108+, the Committee of 
Convention 108, in line with the expert note (document T-PD(2019)3), further suggests to 
introduce an additional obligation in the Protocol for Parties to stipulate in their domestic 
legislation that violations of such undertaking by a receiving competent authority or data 
controller in their territory may give rise to all judicial and non-judicial sanctions and rem-
edies available under their laws. 
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29. The Committee of Convention 108 notes that, whilst paragraph 1 of both of the draft 
articles on direct and traditional, expedited ordering of information limits the issuing of 
orders to information which is needed for the issuing Party’s specific criminal investiga-
tions or proceedings, the draft text remains fully silent on the purposes for which trans-
ferred personal data can be used by the receiving competent authority or service pro-
vider. The Committee of Convention 108 furthermore recommends in this regard to in-
clude explanations at least in the Explanatory Report on a commonly agreed distinction 
between data processing (including transfers) for criminal investigation purposes and 
those undertaken for national security purposes in line with the Issue paper “Democratic 
and effective oversight of national security services“ published by the Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe. 
 
30. The Committee of Convention 108 requests that clear use restrictions be inserted in 
the Protocol, applicable to both direct and traditional, expedited cooperation. It suggests 
to phrase such use restrictions based on the provisions of Article 26 of ETS 182 (supra), 
amending them mutatis mutandis and extending them to also cover use limitations upon 
a service provider to which a request is transferred. This could translate in three provi-
sions, in which it is stipulated respectively that: 
 
1. [mutatis mutandis adaptation of Article 26.1 ETS 182] personal data transferred 
by a competent authority or data controller of a Party as a result of the execution 
of an order issued under the Protocol by a competent authority of the receiving 
Party, may be used by the latter only:  
 
a. for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences 
related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in elec-
tronic form of a criminal offence within the scope of articles 14.2 and 25.1 of 
the Budapest Convention; 
b. for other judicial and administrative proceedings directly related to the pro-
ceedings mentioned under (a); 
c. for preventing an immediate and serious threat to public security;  
 
2. [mutatis mutandis adaptation of Article 26.2 ETS 182] such data may however be 
used by the competent authority for any other purpose if prior consent to that ef-
fect is given by either the Party from which the data had been transferred, or the 
data subject1.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 If solely addressed from a data protection perspective, the consent of the data subject ought to be avoided 
as a ground for data processing in the context of judicial and law enforcement cooperation in criminal mat-
ters. However, it should be stressed that the possibility of reliance on the consent of the person concerned is 
formally part of the contemporary acquis of MLA in criminal matters, both at Council of Europe (Article 26.2 
ETS 182) and EU level (Article 23.1, under (d) of the EU MLA Convention of 29 May 2000, which was not 
abrogated from by the European Investigation Order Directive). It is actually the case that the possibility to 
rely on consent of the person concerned functions here as an extra guarantee for that person in the context 
of the so called specialty principle (which is the traditional correlative of the purpose limitation principle in 
data protection law). The specialty principle traditionally has a trust function: the requesting sate or authority 
ought not to use data for other purposes than the initial purposes, so as not to betray the trust put in it by the 
executing state or authority in sending the data concerned for those initial purposes. Since the requested 
state or authority might have refused cooperation or data transfer for other than the initial purposes, the spe-
cialty principle stipulates that additional consent of the executing state or authority must be sought in case of 
intended use beyond the initial purposes (comparable with the control principle in data protection law). To 
allow for consent of the data subject as a basis for further use could be supported in the very context of use 
restrictions in the future Protocol regime.  
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3. [extension to cover use limitations for service providers] the request received and 
the information it contains can only be used by the receiving service provider for 
the purpose of the execution of an order issued under this Protocol. 
 
7. Substantive data protection principles 
 
31. To the extent that the option of accession by the Protocol Parties to Convention 
108+ (supra, under para 22) does not prove feasible, the Committee of Convention 108 
urges that the below safeguards, grounded in, closely aligned with and consistently in-
terpreted in line with Convention 108+, would be incorporated in the Protocol as manda-
tory common safeguards. In an even more subsidiary manner, the Committee of Con-
vention 108 urges that, as an absolute minimum, the Protocol allows service providers or 
competent authorities to require, as a precondition before transferring any personal data, 
the receiving competent authority or service provider to undertake to process the per-
sonal data transferred subject to the conditions and safeguards under the domestic law 
of the Party from where personal data would be transferred, guaranteeing the protection 
of individuals by the implementation of at least the following safeguards, grounded in, 
closely aligned with and consistently interpreted in line with Convention 108+ [allowing 
flexibility as to possible re-ordering, clustering etc.]: 
 
a. purpose legitimacy, purpose specificity and purpose limitation; 
b. lawfulness; 
c. fairness and transparency; 
d. necessity for and proportionality to the legitimate purpose pursued;  
e. non-excessive data processing and data minimisation; 
f. adequacy, relevance and accuracy of data; 
g. data retention limitation;   
h. accountability of controllers and processors; 
i. logging, data security and data breach notification duty;  
j. information security 
k. specific, additional safeguards for special categories of sensitive data; 
l. lawful use of exceptions and derogations; 
m. enforceable data subjects’ rights and effective administrative or judicial redress; 
n. appropriate protection in (onward) data transfers; 
o. effective independent oversight. 
 
31. Finally, the Committee of Convention 108 stresses the importance of the effectivity of 
the data protection safeguards and ensuring that Parties to the Second additional Proto-
col effectively apply and enforce them in practice. The Committee proposes that an eval-
uation of the implementation of the data protection safeguards be carried out, possibly 
relying on the findings and recommendations of the mechanism introduced in Article 4.3 
of Convention 108+ for Parties to Convention 108+, and, for other countries, on Article 
23.f of Convention 108+. The articulation of the work of the T-CY and of the Committee 
of Convention 108+ in that regard should be further examined. 
